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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT 
THORNOCK, et al, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
LOIS S. COOK, 
Defendant and Appellant 
CASE NO. 16231 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to mineral rights in 
certain real property located in Rich County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Rich County granted a Default 
Certificate against all defendants except Appellant LOIS 
S. COOK, who alone appeared and answered; granted Summary 
Judgment for Plaintiffs upon Plaintiffs' Motion; and issued 
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a Decree of Quiet Title confirming title to the dis;icc;: 
mineral rights in plaintiffs. From this Surnrnary Juc;v,;· 
and Decree, Defendant LOIS S. COOK appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment 
below, and a remand to the District Court for a trial t: 
jury on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant refers to and incorporates herein by 
reference the Statement set forth in Appellant's Brief 
on this Appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD INDICATES A DEFECT IN THORNOCK'S TITLE 
TO THE REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE, AND SUCH DEFECT MUST BE 
RESOLVED BEFORE THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES HEREIN CAN BE 
DETERMINED. 
A. COOK HAS AN INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY IN 
DISPUTE SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE HER TO RAISE THE 
ISSUE OF THE ALLEGED DEFECT. 
B. SHOULD THE COURT FIND A DEFECT IN THORNOCK'S 
TITLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE, COOK 
CAN ASSERT A CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY BY REASON 
OF ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
C. SHOULD THE COURT FIND COOK'S CLAIM TO THE 
PROPERTY BY REASON OF ADVERSE POSSESSION 
VALID, THORNOCK HAS NO RIGHT TO THE 
MINERALS. 
Respondents in their Brief on Appeal (RB) for the 
first time challenge the "standing" of COOK to raise the 
defect in THORNOCK'S title. (RB 15) They set forth, with 
authoritative support, the proposition that a defendant 
in an action to quiet title cannot defeat plaintiff's 
-3-
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title by showing a superior title in some third person 
through whom the defendant makes no claim. Un f ortunatei; 
such proposition is irrelevant to the case. Appellant c: 
is making no attempt to defeat defendant THORNOCK's tit'.; 
by showing a superior title in some third person. COOK 
is merely raising the issue of the defect in THORNOCK's 
title in order to demonstrate that COOK herself, as a 
remote grantee of THORNOCK, does not have title to the 
property by deed, but rather has title to the property be 
adverse possession. 
Respondents correctly cite, but incorrectly apply, 
the general rule stated at 65 Am. Jur. 2d "Quieting Tit:' 
§45, in part: 
In this regard, it has been said that the 
court determines the rights of the parties 
under the pleadings and evidence, grants 
proper relief, and determines the better 
title as between the parties to the pro-
ceeding, though a title superior to the 
rights of either party may be held by a 
stranger to the suit. 
(emphasis added) 
COOK is only concerned with proving that she has a 
better title to the property than THORNOCK, not with 
asserting that any stranger to the suit has a super~r 
title. The defect in Thornock' s title is only being 
raised to prove the superiority of COOK's title. 
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Further, Respondents claim that by asserting that 
THORNOCK's title is defective, COOK defeats any claim 
she has to the title through the chain of title and so 
makes herself a stranger to the title with no "standing" 
to assert the defect. A person has standing to raise a 
claim or defense whenever his or her rights or interests, 
legal or equitable, are affected or threatened. A person 
must have 
some real interest in the cause of action, 
or a legal or equitable right, title, or 
interest in the subject matter of the 
controversy, sometimes spoken of as 
standing. 
59 Am. Jur. 2d "Parties" §26 at 374. 
As discussed below, this issue is not a frivolous immaterial 
matter to COOK. The decision as to the defect in THORNOCK's 
title will substantially affect her legal right and interest 
in the property. Clearly, the defect in THORNOCK's title is 
an issue which COOK may and must raise. 
As argued at Point I .B. of Appellant's Brief (AB } , 
should the court find a defect in THORNOCK's title to the 
real property in dispute, COOK can assert a claim to the 
property by reason of adverse possession since she and her 
late husband took possession of the property in 1952 and 
occupied and used it for the statutory period. Respondents 
argue that there is no provision under Utah law for assertion 
of adverse possession where the claimant has entered into 
-5-
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possession without claim of title, and it is argued, 
since COOK asserts she does not have title as a remo~ 
grantee of THORNOCK, she entered into possession withou, 
claim of title and therefore cannot adversely possess. 
Respondents fall into the trap of failing to 
distinguish between "claim of title" and "color of 
title". This distinction is at 3 Arn. Jur. 2d "Adverse 
Possession" §96 at 177. 
Terms such as 'claim of right', "claim of 
ownership' .... mean nothing more than the 
intention of the disseisor to appropriate 
and use the land as his own to the exclu-
sion of all others, irrespective of any 
semblance or shadow of actual title or 
right ........ . 
'Color of title', on the other hand, is th~ 
which gives the semblance or appearance of 
title, but is not title in fact--that which, 
on its face, professes to pass title, but 
fails to do so because of a want of title 
in the person from whom it comes or the 
employment of an ineffective means of 
conveyance. 
These differences between 'color' and 
'claim' of title becomes important in 
view of the fact that in order that a 
possession may ripen into a title, 
occupancy under a 'claim' of title or 
right is indispensable, while 'color' 
of title is not necessary, unless 
required by statute. 
As respondents note (RB 15), Utah law only requires 
" 1 f t · tl " Utah Code !>.~· 
"claim of title", not co or o 1 e . ~ 
(Repl. Vol. 9 A 1977) §78-12-8 and §78-12-10. 
-6-
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Claim of title can be demonstrated by conduct. The 
Virginia Supreme Court in Walton v. Rosson, 216 Va. 732, 
222 S.E. 2d 553 (1976) set forth the criteria which the 
majority of jurisdictions hold sufficient to establish 
claim of title: 
Claim of title, as opposed to color of 
title, is a mere assertion of ownership 
or right, without paper title. The 
possessor intends to appropriate and use 
the land as his own, to the exclusion of 
all others irrespective of any semblance 
of title or legal right ... A claim of 
right need not be expressed. It is suf-
ficient that the acts of the party in 
possession indicate a claim of ownership. 
The actual occupation, use and improvement 
of the premises, without payment of rent, 
recognition of another's title or disavowal 
of one's own title, raises a presumption 
that the possessor entered and is holding 
as absolute owner. 
Id. at 735. 
COOK and her deceased husband entered upon the 
subject property in 1952 with the intention of using 
it as their own land to the exclusion of all others. 
They used and occupied it from that time forward 
paying no rent to anyone else, recognizing no one 
else's title to it, and claiming it as their own. 
Their conduct certainly manifested a claim of title 
sufficient for them to claim title by reason of 
adverse possession. 
-7-
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I 
It is interesting to note that, even if Utah 1~ 
did require color of title as well as claim of title, 
COOK has color of title on two grounds. First, she has 
her deed, which although inoperable to pass title be-
cause of the defect in THORNOCK' s deed, is operable to 
give her color of title. "Color of title is a writing 
upon its face purporting to pass title, but in fact does 
not". Peterson v. Weber County, 99 Utah 281, 103 P. 2d 
( 1940) . Secondly, she has color of title by operation c' 
law. As stated at Utah Code (Repl. Vol. 6 A 1953). §57-!· 
.any person has color of title who 
has occupied a tract of real estate by 
himself or by those under whom he claims, 
for the term of 5 years. . . . . 
Should the court find COOK's claim to the prop~ey 
by reason of adverse possession valid, THORNOCK has no 
right to the minerals. This conclusion logically follC''3 
from well-established rules of real property. First, ar. 
adverse possessor has absolute title to both surface and 
sub-surface rights. Second, where a quitclaim deed is 
involved after-acquired title does not vest in the gra:ite: 
Respondents challenge this on two separate bases. First, 
it is argued that once COOK acquired title by reason o'. 
adverse possession, the doctrine of after-acquired titli 
mandated that title passed immediately to Johnson, her 
-8-
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immediate granter, and then from Johnson to THORNOCK, 
by reason of the Johnson-Cook and Thornock-Johnson deeds. 
This argument is based on the assertion that a "reserva-
tion" in a deed is a conveyance, so that in the Johnson-
Cook deed, COOK was actually the granter to THORNOCK of 
the mineral rights. This linguistic twist, acting to 
transform the grantees into granters, would enable 
application of the after-acquired property principle in 
reverse. In the case cited by Respondents (RB 20), 
Burton v. United States, 29 Utah 226, 507 P. 2d 710 
(1973), this court is quoted as stating: 
The reservation creates a new right 
issuing out of the property granted, 
which did not exist as an independent 
right before the grant. 
Id. at p. 712 (emphasis added). 
It is a difficult jump from the phrase "new right issuing 
out of the property granted" to reach the conclusion that 
gra~tee becomes granter for purposes of the reservation. 
Furthermore, even if it were conceded that the reservation 
is a granting back of property granted, it would seem only 
logical that it would be necessary that property be validly 
com·eyed initially. As stated at 23 Arn. Jur. 2d "Deeds" 
§262 at p. 297-8: 
-9-
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. the terms 'reservation' and 'exception, 
are quite conunonly used as interchanaeabl 
terms .... The factor conunon to both ~n e 
exception and reservation is that each sub-
tracts. or deducts from the thing granted 
narrowing and limiting what would other-' 
wise p~ss by the general words of grant. 
Accordingly, either a reservation or an 
exception in a deed, to be effective 
must be of some right or interest ow~ed 
by the granter in the land at the time 
the deed was made. Also, regardless of 
the nomenclature used by the grantor, the 
meaning intended must be determined by 
reference to the subject matter and the 
surrounding circumstances. 
(emphasis added) . 
In the case at bar, appellants are alleging that 
THORNOCK had a defective title and, therefore, had no 
title to pass to Johnson, who in turn had no title ~ 
pass to COOK. Arguably, the gr an tor for each deed ther. 
had no right or interest to convey at the time the deed 
was made, and therefore the reservation was inef:ective. 
Phillips v. Johnson, 202 Okla. 645, 217 P. 2d 520 
(1950) involved a situation similar to the one in the 
instant case. Plaintiff in Phillips conveyed real 
property to Grantee I with a reservation of mineral 
rights in Plaintiff. Grantee I conveyed to Grantee II 
with the same reservation stated in their conveyan~· 
Grantee II them conveyed to Plaintiff with the same 
reservation because he was under the misunderstanding 
· ui'.'· 
that the clause was necessary to preserve the contin · 
-10-
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of reservation in himself, and Grantee II so understood 
the situation. After Plaintiff became owner of the 
property, Grantee II died, and his heirs did not even 
try to establish that Grantee II could reserve the 
~ineral rights if he did not originally have them. 
Defendant apparently concedes that a 
reservation in a deed, to be effective, 
must reserve some right or interest 
owned or possessed by grantor in the 
land at the time the deed was made, 
~ince this rule is well established. 
Id. at p. 646. 
The court examined the circumstances and the parties' 
intentions and determined that the mineral rights were 
originally reserved in Plaintiff's name and, therefore, 
since Grar.tee II never had them, she could not reserve 
them. 
Likewise, since neither Johnson nor THORNOCK ever 
owned the mineral rights by fault of the defects in the 
chain of title, they could not reserve them and so the 
after-acquired property rule did not act to convey the 
rights to them once they were acquired by COOK by virtue 
of adverse possession. 
Secondly, respondents argue that the established 
principle that after-acquired title does not vest in the 
grantee where a quitclaim deed is involved should not be 
-11-
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applied to the instant situation. Appellants agree that 
there is an exception which is applicable in certain 
situations. As stated at 26 C.J.S. "Deeds" §118 at p. g; 
An after acquired title may pass, however, 
under special circumstances, as where a 
person conveys by quitclaim deed and 
covenants against a particular title 
which he afterwards acquires. 
(emphasis added). 
The cases where the exception to the established principii 
stated above is applied, involve situations where the 
language of the quitclaim deed contains a convenant quit· 
claiming all right and title in possession and expectancy 
or contains covenants of further assurances. The cue~ 
by respondents as authority, McAdams v. Bailey, 169 Ind. 
618, 82 N.E. 1057 (1907) itself contained a quitcla~~~ 
with such a covenant: 
.the interest conveyed by said 
Zachariah T. Lincoln is the equal, 
undivided one-third part of two-thirds 
of the same, and any other interest 
which might accrue to said Zachariah T. 
Lincoln after the death of said 
Elizabeth, his mother. 
Id.at p. 520 (emphasis added). 
. st •;hiC On the basis of the language "and any other 1ntere · 
might accrue", the court held title in after-acquired p'.C: 
erty passed to the grantee of the quitclaim deed when 
by grantor. 
-12-
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In the case at bar, the quitclaim deed from COOK 
to THORNOCK contained no such covenant. Therefore, in 
accord with Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 6 A 1953) §57-1-13, 
the effect of the quitclaim deed was simply to convey COOK's 
interest in the property at the date of the deed, and since 
COOK's title by adverse possession had not yet ripened, COOK 
has no interest to convey. 
Therefore, if the court finds that COOK's claim of 
adverse possession is valid, THORNOCK has no right to the 
minerals under any theory. 
-13-
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POINT 2 
THE RECORD SHOWS THAT QUESTIONS OF FACT AS TO THE 
VALIDITY OF THE QUITCLAIM DEED EXIST WHICH WARRANT A TRI.\: 
ON THE MERITS. 
Respondents contend that under Rule 56 (e), Utah Ruk 
-----..: 
of Civil Procedure, the assertions of COOK in her Second 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim may not be considered by: 
Court since they are legal conclusions. In the subject 
pleading, COOK denies that she ever executed the Quitclai: 
Deed - this is a statement of fact based on personal knoi· 
edge. It is not a conclusion, not an opinion and not heo: 
Additionally, in the subject pleading the issue is raisec 
regarding the insertion by hand of the land descri~ioor 
page 1 of the quitclaim deed. COOK denies knowledge oft' 
insertion or the surrounding circumstances, and in fact, 
she did not initial the insertion. The fact of the inser· 
tion as well as the fact of COOK' s lack of knowledge and 
consent are not legal conclusions, not opinion and not 
hearsay. They raise factual issues affecting the validit; 
of the quitclaim deed. 
Even if the Court did not consider the allegatioM~ 
the Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, the balance c 
the record shows sufficient issues of fact regarding the 
· 1 on the validity of the quitclaim deed to warrant a tr1a 
merits. 1 ' Br1· ef i!t Po!'. This is amply argued in Appe lant s 
-14-
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To briefly recapitulate, the deed on its face raises 
questions: namely, the above-mentioned after-inserted 
land description, undated and uninitialled by COOK; 
page 2, the signature page, contains only signatures 
with no reference to page l; the qualitative differences 
in stationery between pages 1 and 2. Certainly these are 
questions which cannot be resolved absent additional 
evidence and the testimony of expert witnesses. Further, 
COOK's deposition raises triable issues of fact. In it, 
she states repeatedly that she has no recollection of 
having executed a quitclaim deed. She only recalls that 
she signed a "paper", one executed solely because she 
and her husband were continually "hounded" by THORNOCK. 
Obviously, there are serious doubts as to the validity 
of the quitclaim deed. 
As this court s~ated in Durham v. Margetts, 571 
P. 2 1332 (Utah 1977),: 
The surrunary judgment procedure has the 
desirable and salutary purpose of elimi-
nating the time, trouble and expense of 
a trial when there are no issues of fact 
in dispute and the controversy can be 
resolved as a matter of law. Neverthe-
less, that should not be done on conjec-
ture, but only when the matter is clear; 
and in case of doubt, the doubt should 
be resolved in allowing the challenging 
party the opportunity of at least attemp-
ting to prove his right to recover. For 
-15-
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that :::-eason, the." s1:1bmissions" [pleadings, 
depositions, admissions and affidavits] 
should be looked at in the light most 
favorable to her position and unless the 
court is able to conclude that there is 
no dispute on material facts, which if r~ 
solved in her favor would entitle her to 
recover, the court should not summarily 
reject her claim and render judgment against 
her as a matter of law. Upon review we applz 
the same standard as that applied by the 
trial court. 
Id. at p. 1334 (emphasis added). 
Looked at in the light most favorable to COOK, the 
submissions manifest questions of fact regarding the 
validity of the quitclaim deed which could be resolved 
in COOK' s favor, and which might thereby affect the judg· 
ment. Therefore, it would seem that summary judgment 
should not have been given against her as a matter of 
law. 
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CONCLUSION 
There are substantial questions of fact to be 
resolved regarding the validity of the quitclaim deed. 
If it is determined to be invalid, the mineral rights 
in the subject property were not conveyed to THORNOCK. 
Even if the quitclaim deed is held to be valid, 
since COOK has title to the property by adverse posses-
sion, a title which had not ripened at the time the 
quitclaim deed was executed, the mineral rights were 
not conveyed to THORNOCK by the quitclaim deed. The 
determination of the validity of COOK's claim to title 
by virtue of adverse possession necessitates the resolu-
tion of factual questions regarding the defect in 
THORNOCK's title. 
The existence of questions of fact as to the 
validity of the quitclaim deed and the validity of 
THORNOCK's title, warrant a trial on the merits. 
For these reasons, appellant prays this honorable 
court to set aside the summary judgment below, together 
with the decree of quiet title, and to remand the entire 
matter for a trial on the merits in the District Court. 
DATED September 28, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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